It’s the vibe: High Court to rule on Bitcoin property dispute

The High Court of Australia has granted special leave to rule on whether bitcoin is capable of being property. The case involves a dispute between Adam Poulton and Jeff Conrad and concerns Conrad’s payment to Poulton to invest $10,000 in Bitcoin on his behalf.

This development follows the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Tasmania decision, which endorsed, in obiter, a third category of property for crypto assets (beyond possession and choses in action) and suggested that control via private keys may be sufficient to establish possession of what is intangible property.

In his special leave application, Poulton argues that bitcoin, while something people are willing to exchange for currency, is not property capable of being possessed under Australian common law and is instead merely “information in a database”. The applicant relies on the orthodox distinction between choses in possession and choses in action. Choses in possession are tangible items that can be physically held or owned, whereas choses in action are intangible rights or property (i.e., debts, shares, or contractual rights) that cannot be physically held and can only be enforced or claimed through legal action.

On this basis, Poulton submits that possession has always required physical custody of a tangible thing, with the consequence that torts such as conversion and detinue are unavailable. He describes bitcoin as “a unique address on a network of computers”, arguing that this does not make it a unique item of property. As such, he contends that bitcoin cannot be possessed in the legal sense.

Conrad, who was successful in the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Tasmania, argues that bitcoin is property capable of possession when understood by reference to control and exclusivity rather than physical holding. They submit that possession has never been limited to tangible objects and that control of the private key gives the holder exclusive power to deal with the bitcoin and to exclude others.

This development will be closely watched, particularly in light of the progression of the Corporations Amendment (Digital Assets Framework) Bill 2025, which follows the reasoning of Poulton v Conrad [2025] TASFC 7 and distinguishes possession of digital tokens from possession of general items. Under section 86 of the draft legislation, general items are taken to be possessed if they are in a person’s custody or under a person’s control, whereas digital tokens are taken to be possessed if the person is capable of exerting factual control over the electronic record, or as prescribed by the regulations. “Factual control” is defined as the ability to transfer the token, exclude others from transferring the token, or demonstrate either of those abilities.

This decision will be keenly awaited, as it is expected to bring much‑needed clarity to the classification of crypto‑assets and the availability of tortious and proprietary remedies under Australian law. Following a long line of overseas cases, the case is likely to be closely watched in the common law world, as the first such case to reach a court of final appeal.

Written by Steven Pettigrove, Luke Higgins and Tahlia Kelly