Service in cyberspace: Victorian judgment targets crypto scams

The County Court of Victoria has delivered a significant ruling in Siegers v Nest Services Ltd & Ors [2026] VCC 15,  confirming that orthodox civil procedure rules can be deployed to pursue cryptocurrency fraud, even where perpetrators are unidentified and exchanges are offshore. In a practical win for scam victims, the Court allowed preliminary discovery against multiple cryptocurrency exchanges to obtain information capable of identifying the controllers of wallets through which allegedly stolen crypto moved. The Court also endorsed service by email on offshore exchanges, recognising the operational reality of globally‑distributed, online crypto businesses.

Background

The applicant alleged that he had been induced, through misrepresentations by persons associated with a fictitious investment business, to transfer approximately AUD $463,000 into cryptocurrency during early 2023. The funds were converted to crypto (primarily USDT) and transferred through a series of wallets hosted by multiple cryptocurrency exchanges.

Forensic tracing identified wallet addresses, transaction hashes, and transaction flows across exchanges including Binance, Bitstamp, Galaxy Digital, KuCoin, HitBTC, N.Exchange and VALR. However, despite reasonable inquiries, the individuals controlling most of those wallets could not be identified. The exchanges indicated they held relevant KYC and account information but would only disclose it pursuant to court order.

The applicant therefore sought:

1. preliminary discovery under rule 32.03 of the County Court Civil Procedure Rules 2018 (Vic) to identify potential defendants; and

2. substituted service under rule 6.10, given that most respondents were domiciled overseas and operated almost entirely online.

   
   

Preliminary discovery to identify crypto wallet holders

Rule 32.03 permits discovery where an applicant, having made reasonable inquiries, cannot sufficiently identify a prospective defendant, but another party is likely to hold information assisting that identification.

Judge Wise emphasised that the rule does not operate on a mere suspicion or “hunch”, the applicant must establish a plausible case of wrongdoing. On the evidence, including forensic tracing reports and documentation of the applicant’s losses, the Court was satisfied that the applicant had been defrauded and that the unidentified wallet holders were potentially involved in the wrongdoing.

A key issue was scope of permissible discovery. Rule 32.03 is directed to discovering documents that assist in identifying the “description” of a person, being terms defined to include matters such as name, residence, occupation and whether the person is an individual or corporation. At first glance, transaction records, IP addresses and account statements might appear to exceed that purpose.

The Court rejected a narrow reading and accepted that, in a crypto fraud context, transactional documents may assist in identifying wallet holders or downstream recipients of assets and therefore fall within the permissible scope of preliminary discovery, this is in light of the fact that the identity of one wallet holder was ascertained through IP addresses and email addresses.

Substituted service on offshore exchanges

The Court granted substituted service under Rule 6.10 for seven of the eight exchanges.

Evidence showed that the exchanges operated digitally, had engaged with the applicant’s solicitors via email or online portals, and had indicated they would act on court orders.

Applying established authority, the Court concluded that requiring formal service in multiple foreign jurisdictions (i.e., Seychelles, Luxembourg, New York, Hong Kong, Turks and Caicos Islands, Costa Rice and South Africa) would be impracticable and inconsistent with the overarching purpose of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic). The Judge determined that email service was likely to bring the proceedings to the respondents’ attention and was therefore appropriate.

Judge Wise stated:

...the respondents each operate their business almost entirely online.  The choice of domicile of the corporation concerned is likely to be a matter of convenience to the corporation concerned…. I do note that all but one of the respondents have structured their affairs so as to engage with the applicant’s solicitors via some electronic communications, whether by email (predominantly) and in one instance by a Zendesk-type ticketing arrangement.

Service was deemed effective where documents had already been provided electronically. One respondent, which had not responded to any communications and for which no reliable electronic service method was available, was excluded from the substituted service orders.

Crypto as property - and why it matters

The Court’s reasoning reflects a broader and increasingly settled judicial view that decentralisation or offshore structuring will not place digital asset activity beyond the reach of the courts where intermediaries exercise real control or hold identifying information.

That approach is consistent with views expressed by Judge Wise outside the courtroom. In a recent presentation on cryptocurrency fraud and civil procedure, his Honour addressed the treatment of cryptoassets as property  - a question that has featured prominently in recent cases - and the practical consequences of that characterisation for proprietary claims, tracing and discovery. Those views are reflected in Siegers and sharply illustrate why characterisation matters.

As Judge Wise explained in that presentation:

“I accepted that the plaintiff’s case was properly characterised as one involving the misappropriation of ‘property’, not merely the misuse of information… That characterisation informed both the availability and the scope of preliminary discovery.”

By framing cryptocurrency as property rather than information, the Court unlocked a full suite of proprietary and equitable claims - including deceit, constructive trust, knowing assistance and tracing - and was willing to deploy procedural tools to identify the persons controlling the wallets through which the assets had moved.

For fraud victims, this materially expands the remedies and procedural avenues available. For exchanges and intermediaries, it underscores that courts will look past technical labels and offshore structures to the underlying substance of how digital assets are held and controlled.

Conclusion

The decision confirms that Australian courts are prepared to pursue cryptocurrency fraud using orthodox civil procedure tools, even where perpetrators are unidentified and platforms operate offshore. By taking a pragmatic approach to discovery and service, the Court signalled a willingness to look through digital structures and jurisdictional complexity to the reality of how crypto assets are controlled. For fraud victims, this materially strengthens available remedies. For exchanges and intermediaries, it underscores growing judicial scrutiny of businesses that hold transaction‑level or identifying information, sharpening the focus on compliance, engagement and litigation‑risk strategy.

Written by Steven Pettigrove, Katrina Sharman, Will Deeb and Tahlia Kelly